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where the scale of the temporal canvas ensures that very few variables can be 
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economics stresses structural forces, while traditional history emphasizes inertial 
forces, but on closer analysis these are shown to be complementary. 
0 1987 Academic Press, Inc. 
In spite of himself, [the economic historian’s] aims. . .will include some attempt 
to discover the inner meaning of economic history, to unveil the mysteries of the 
growth and decay of custom, and other phenomena which we are not any longer 
contented to take as ultimate and insoluble facts given by nature. 
-Alfred Marshall’ 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Customs and institutions play an important role in shaping not only 
society but also economic relations within it. Yet the standard economics 
literature tends to relegate the social framework to footnotes and par- 
enthetical asides. In recent years several authors have tried to endogenize 
customs, rules, and institutions and to explore the economic consequences 
of these. This new institutional economics4 is likely to be important for 
various branches of economics and especially for the economic historian 
whose large canvas compels him to grapple with the problem of institutional 
change. These new developments could offer him a unifying method. 
Not surprisingly, the new institutional economics (NIE) has met with 
strong methodological criticism. A particularly penetrating critique is that 
of Field (1981), who has argued that no real advance can be expected 
from NIE and that its endeavors will soon fade into oblivion unless a 
substantial rethinking of research objectives occurs. He tries to substantiate 
this claim by dissecting a work which embodies the characteristics of 
this research program in its extreme form (namely North and Thomas, 
1973) but he claims that his critique applies also to the general research 
program and the theoretical tendencies which gave rise to this research 
in the first place (Field, 1981, p. 175). 
The present paper explores the potential of the method of NIE in the 
context of economic history. It begins with a critique of Field’s critique. 
Concerning the question of endogeneity, Field rightly maintains that some 
rules must be presupposed in any economic analysis and model building. 
From this he goes on to argue that some particular variables, namely 
those that are noneconomic, must be treated as parametric. We show 
in Section 2 that such an inference is incorrect. The problem of endogeneity 
in general and in economic history in particular is also discussed. 
On the question of optimality our position tends to coincide with Field’s 
rather than that of the authors he is criticizing, notably North and Thomas 
(1973) and Posner (1973). These and several other writers have maintained 
that the institutions which exist in a society are the ones which are 
efficient for that society. Drawing on some recent developments in economic 
theory, we try to show in Section 3 that such a theorem is untenable. 
Much of the existing literature fails to treat an important cognate issue 
which should be of particular interest to historians, namely the relationship 
between structural and historical explanations. NIE tends to be structural, 
4 We use the phrase “new institutional economics” to refer to the work of such writers 
as Coase, Alchian, Williamson, Posner, and North (latest vintage), and to a certain extent 
Akerlof. We prefer it to the term “neoclassical institutional economics” used by Field 
since neoclassicism refers paradigmatically to neoclassical growth theory and general equi- 
librium theory to which NIE is often opposed, because these theories tend to neglect 
institutions; e.g., they consider &ms as “black boxes” and this is held to lead to gross 
inadequacies (Alchian, 1984, p. 40). 
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explaining an institution as an optimal institutional solution without ref- 
erence to the past. This is the opposite of what historians tend to do. 
We urge in Section 4 that both structural and historical explanations are 
needed in economic history, and that these are complementary rather 
than exclusive. What is needed, therefore, is a proper assessment of the 
interplay between structural and historical forces, and NIE seems to be 
fruitful precisely because it raises this issue and thus challenges habitual 
ways of thought, not in the abstract but in actual analysis. However, 
neither North and Thomas nor Posner can be taken as paradigmatic, 
since they are unclear with regard to this point. 
2. ENDOGENEITY 
If we wish to explain a certain phenomenon, we take something as 
given. Such givens are always provisional, subject to other influences 
left out of our picture. We might fix a certain technology, certain tastes, 
certain endowments, and certain rules of behavior for studying a single 
market in isolation, yet each of these givens might be endogenized. 
Neither technology, nor tastes, nor endowments, nor rules are natural 
constants. There are theories explaining technological change (Schmookler, 
1966; von WeizGicker, 1%6), tastes (Duesenberry, 1949; von Weizsticker, 
1971), and endowments (Stiglitz, 1969; Schlicht, 1975). In this vein NIE 
extends the analysis by trying to explain rules and institutions.5 Customs, 
rules, and institutions, we take it, refer to different degrees of embodiment 
of the same thing. It is hard to draw exact boundaries between them, 
and we follow the literature in treating them largely synonymously in 
the following. This is sufficient for our present purposes. 
Endogenization always proceeds ‘by taking former givens as endogenous 
variables and starting from other givens; hence one approaches by assuming 
a certain spectrum of feasible technologies, assuming regularities in pref- 
erence formation or, in the case of rules, analyzing the growth or decay 
of some while presupposing the validity of others. All these givens could 
be endogenized further. 
This Marshallian view is not incompatible with neoclassicism, as might 
appear from Field’s (1981, p. 195) assertion that “neoclassical theory 
presupposes . . . four categories of exogenous variables: tastes, tech- 
nologies, endowments, and rules” (italics in original). Neoclassicists, 
like other intellectuals, properly define their work by method rather than 
by a particular model, and the neoclassical method does not entail a firm 
list of givens. 
’ Wittman (1982) presents an economic analysis of rules pertaining to traffic and sports 
activities which might illustrate the point. A very rudimentary, albeit neoclassical, attempt 
to analyze the breakdown of morals may be found in Schlicht (1984b). 
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It is true that (a) some rules must be presupposed for any economic 
discourse including the most elementary analysis of market problems.6 
Field establishes (a) with great care. But having done so he quickly 
moves on, as if by obvious inference, to assert that (b) some particular 
rules or variables must be taken as parametrically given when building 
models. He further asserts that it is the noneconomic variables which 
constitute the base “we eventually ground on” (Field, 1981, p. 1’93). 
We, in this paper, accept (a) and reject (b). A little reflection shows that 
this entails no contradiction. It seems reasonable to assert that all givens 
in economic and historical analysis are provisional and ought to be en- 
dogenized if the problem requires this and our scientific ability permits. 
There is, short of the laws of nature, no sensible firm starting point. 
What we might select as given and as endogenous depends on the problem 
we wish to analyze. 
There seems to be no real reason why any noneconomic variable should 
always be exempt from endogenization. The most acceptable position 
here seems to be the Marshallian one-that the set of endogenous variables 
increases as the time span under review increases. A variable is exogenous 
to a model if it is not affected by the endogenous variables of that model. 
Whether the .variable is economic or noneconomic is immaterial. It is 
possible, depending on the context, that (i) an economic variable will be 
exogenous and (ii) a noneconomic variable will be endogenous. Suppose 
we are studying the Sri Lankan economy. Conceivably its functioning 
is sensitive to the U.S. inflation rate although the U.S. inflation rate is 
not affected by the Sri Lankan economy. Thus it will be legitimate to 
treat this economic variable, namely the U.S. inflation rate, as exogenous 
in our model, Concerning the endogeneity of noneconomic variables we 
merely note that even the weather is influenced by economic development, 
for example, by the cutting down of tropical forests in the Amazon basin. 
Although the weather is taken as given in short-run analysis, we might 
gain insight into certain long-run developments by taking the climatic 
consequences of economic development into account. 
Thus the selection of givens involves substantive assumptions. The 
tendencies or movements which we want to explain should not work 
back on our givens too strongly; retroaction of the endogenous phenomena 
on the givens should not destroy our results. Furthermore, the givens 
should be sticiently stable for the tendencies we wish to describe to 
have had a long enough run to materialize. In short, the givens should 
be stable with regard to the processes we want to explain. This is the 
6 See Basu (1983, 1984, Chap. 1). It is theoretically unclear whether the market system 
can be self-enforcing in the sense of reproducing the rules underlying its functioning (Arrow, 
1972; von Weizs,kker, 1980, pp. 72-76) but it is quite clear that the spontaneous observation 
of rules can be observed in many cases and may also be economically advantageous insofar 
as it saves enforcement costs. 
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isolation principle (Schlicht, 1985, pp. 17-21).7 We should not assume, 
for instance, that investment has no significant effect on productive ca- 
pacities in the long run, nor should we assume in a long-run model that 
tax morals remain constant while tax rates change. This methodological 
perspective can have significant implications for economic history. We 
illustrate some of these in the remainder of this section and return to 
some larger issues in Section 4. 
The first example concerns transaction costs and institutions. We em- 
phatically agree with Field (1981, pp. 186-187) that transaction costs 
cannot be deduced from the formal incentive structure of a particular 
set of rules, since transaction costs are heavily dependent on morals and 
custom.’ Once morals and customs are treated as endogenous, however, 
the transaction costs associated with a particular institution may depend 
on its history. Switching, say, directly from guild organization to the 
modern firm might have been inefficient because of prohibitive problems 
of enforcement. It may on the other hand have been efficient to switch 
from the guild system to the putting-out system, and then to the modern 
firm. 
The second illustration concerns the role of cultural explanations in 
economic history. The choice between economic or cultural modes of 
explanation involves substantive hypotheses about the relative stabilities 
of various features of the problem at hand. What ought to be a given 
for one question ought to be an endogenous variable for another, and 
vice versa. The selection of givens is, hence, not a matter of classification 
(whether something is economic or not) but rather a result of reasoned 
hypotheses about interactions among the various ‘factors involved. 
Cultural explanations often refer, for example, to certain customs which 
determine how people behave. But these customs themselves are often 
changing as a result of economic changes. Cultural explanations often 
imply a degree of concreteness and stability that may be present in the 
language describing them but as far as the content of customs goes is 
being eroded by economic forces. Marshall saw this clearly: 
Sometimes these forces break down the custom altogether; but often they evade 
it by gradual and imperceptible changes in the character of the thing sold so that 
the purchaser gets a new thing at the old price under an old name. _ . . But in 
fact the payments and dues, which custom is supposed to stereotype, nearly 
always contain elements which are incapable of precise definition; white the accounts 
of them handed down by tradition are embodied in loose and vague impressions, 
or at best are expressed in words that make no attempt at scientific exactness. 
We can watch the intluence of this vagueness in the agreements between landlord 
’ Field (1981, p. 195, note 23) alludes to this requirement but does not draw the conclusions 
for the argument that must follow. 
’ North (1984, 1985) has recently taken explicit account of this by referring to “ideafogy,” 
and Williamson (1975) captures it by “atmosphere.” 
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and tenant even in modern England; for they have always been interpreted by 
the aid of customs, which have ever been imperceptibly growing and dwindling 
again, to meet the changing exigencies of successive generations.’ 
A cultural explanation may therefore be valid in the short run, but this 
does not imply that it is also valid in the long run. 
If a custom, say one of paying certain dues, actually adapts to scarcity, 
“rounding off the edges of change” (Marshall, 1920, p. 641), then an 
economic treatment of the dues as implicit prices might be adequate in 
long-run analysis. A “culturalist” opposite to this “economistic” case 
would be a theory of autonomous cultural development explaining prices 
as, perhaps, implicit communications to which economic forces adapt. 
No convincing cultural theory of this type seems to have appeared. 
Indeed, both custom and economic forces may be essential for certain 
explanations. Assume, for example, that a certain custom (honesty, per- 
haps) leads to economic growth, but that economic growth destroys the 
custom. Taking the custom as parametric may lead to the erroneous 
conclusion that its decay (less honesty) impedes economic growth.” 
Clearly rules, like those concerning honesty, and economic processes 
interact in this manner. This renders doubtful the position that rules 
logically antedate the market, insofar as it is intended to suggest that 
the alleged logical priority has causal significance.1’ In a more recent 
essay Field (1984) has written lucidly about these issues, illustrating them 
with a very interesting account of the role of language in market behavior. 
However, a deeper search of evidence shows that his position is vulnerable. 
By no means is it evident that language is indispensable for economic 
activity. There seem to have been numerous cases of “silent trade” in 
which arriving merchants left goods in a clearing and retreated into the 
bush while local inhabitants inspected the goods, took what they wanted, 
and in turn left some native products. Herodotus described ,Phoenicians 
engaging in the “dumb barter” of salt for gold on the coast of Guinea 
2000 years ago: a small initial risk, much tutonnemen~, a lot of trade, 
no language. Neutral ports of trade, strategically located, arose to service 
the meetings of strangers on foreign coasts with which ,commerce had 
begun (Polanyi, 1966, p. 99). The inhabitants of cities shut in because 
of the plague reverted to silent trade with farmers, leaving payment in 
9 Marshall (1920, pp. 559-560, 638). 
” A “materialistic” position, to continue drawing these caricatures, would entail the 
“economistic” argument plus the explanation of the decay in custom as resulting from 
economic growth. As one may easily see, it has the same status as the culturahst position. 
” One could argue that the notion of a market “logically antedates” the rules governing 
market behavior, or more generally that the content of the rules--their intended application- 
logicahy antedates the rules. But all these logical statements are, it seems to us, produced 
merely by the way we phrase the problem rather than by the properties of the subject 
matter. 
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a vinegar bath outside the gates in return for food, apparently without 
verbal communication. There is a plaque outside West Gate, Winchester, 
recording an episode of this kind. If it be objected that prices would 
have been known initially, then we suggest that they were not likely to 
hold firm in the circumstances, and a voiceless adjustment is quite possible. 
What happens when speech is possible, there is no common language, 
and the prospect is held out of future commerce? The answer is that 
“people seem to come equipped with whatever is required for negotiating 
a linguistic contract when they do not share a language” (Sankoff, 1980, 
p. 157). What happens is the emergence of a lingua franca, a pidgin, 
“by definition the native language of nobody” (Muhlhausler, as quoted 
by Sankoff, 1980, p. 146). Pidgins are generated as plantation languages, 
slave and nonslave, and where nonnative labor is employed in mines, 
but they are most usual as trade languages, though they are to be dis- 
tinguished from simplified trade languages (also common) which adhere 
too closely to one or the other user’s language to qualify strictly as 
pidgins. Innumerable such tongues have been constructed in the course 
of exploration and trade, from Chinook Jargon to Tok Pisin, from the 
Sino-Russian of the Tsarist-Ching fur mart at Kiakhta to the Sabir (or 
Sabirs) of the medieval and later Mediterranean, Adriatic, Black Sea, 
Levant, and Saharan oases. Sabir was a go-between language described 
as the lingua jhzncu, used by Latins, Arabs, and later Turks, and illustrating 
fusz of more local variants and other transformations (Schuchardt, in 
Gilbert, 1980). The variety of these languages and their rise and fall 
shows nicely that culture in this respect is not to be taken as necessarily 
prior to economic action. Language is a great convenience, but it is not 
absolutely essential and has very often been manufactured by economic 
requirement. A study of methods for coping in lingua fvanca talk, sig- 
nifIcantly entitled “On the Non-Fatal Nature of Trouble,” indeed stresses 
that people who may lack competence in their own language “nevertheless 
turn out to be experts in locating, avoiding, replacing, fixing, ignoring, 
talking about and otherwise dealing with troubles arising in such situations’” 
(Jordan and Fuller, 1975, p. 11). 
Under somewhat more stable circumstances than have attended the 
formation of many pidgins there will perhaps have been an attempt to 
learn the trader’s language, perhaps bastardizing it, rather than for the 
native language to be learned. As Sankoff (1980, p. 157) says, the most 
likely explanation of this “has to do with the relative power of the traders 
in controlling access to valued goods.” Culture, meaning language, is in 
any case a doubtful bottom on which to ground in a world with such a 
convergence on English as the lingua franca of international trade and 
technology, and a convergence on certain computer languages. Conver- 
gence dominates such wasteful, but relatively minor, discrepancies as 
that between the American and Australian color video systems. The 
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question is not whether cultural phenomena may be economicalIy derived- 
they often are-but how to specify whether the structural forces in a 
given case will be strong enough (whether the invested capital or human 
capital is too large?) to impede an economically efficient solution.‘* 
The desire to trade is, after all, strong. It is not self-evident that the 
natural state is a Hobbesian war of one against all, rather than one which 
sees the benefits of trade and the pleasures of fresh human contact. 
Contlicts are not indisputably primary. Many (like the cannibals’ war 
against Man Friday) are derivative in that the aggression seems to have 
been learned, not LIU naturel, but out of particular circumstances. John 
Plamenatz makes a parallel point (quoted ,by Barry, 1978, p. 176): “Man 
is not just an animal who, unlike the others, is provident and calculating 
.,.. men. . . are not mere competitors, however benevolent, in a market 
for the supply of personal wants; they are members of society, and their 
hopes and feelings, both for themselves and others, would not be what 
they are apart from their group loyalties.” 
There are many instances of trade by the private citizens of nations 
at war. Which then comes first, the individual desire to truck and barter 
or the collective desire to fight? Trade, without doubt, is strongly impelled 
by differences in factor endowments that lead it to promise great gains 
for both parties. The task is to specify just when, and when not, people 
transact or fight, since’ neither trade nor martial theft seems logically 
prior. That rules must first exist to get trade established is simply not 
documented. We are not inexorably required to take language or common 
commercial rules .as prerequisites of analysis and to do so may distract 
us from the true conditions under which economic activity began. 
NIE is on the right track in trying to endogenize institutions or customs. 
It offers a method which tries to give an adequate account of process, 
instead of assuming some parametric variation in things both cultural 
and economic which are essentially endogenous. However, the means 
by which this is attempted-ideas about competitive selection of rules 
and institutions-is open to serious doubts. The purpose of the next 
section is to raise some of these. 
3. ~PTIMALITY 
Field’s (1981) critique of what he labels ‘neoclassical institutional 
economics”i3 is somewhat blunted by the fact that it is an undifferentiated 
criticism. He groups under this label the entire methodology of Posner 
(1973) and North and Thomas (1973) and attempts a uniform demolition. 
I* Cf. Paul David (1985) on the retention of Qwerty keyboards. For an extension of the 
analysik of the conditions of ‘increasing return uader which a technology may become 
locked in, see W. Brian Arthur-(1984). 
‘? Which, in this paper, is being referred.to as the new institutional economics. 
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We urge on the contrary that it is crucial to realize that the Posner- 
North-Thomas approach treats institutions as (a) endogenQus and (b) 
socially optimal. The kinds of criticism that can be leveled against en- 
dogeneity and optimality are often distinct and it is possible for a critic 
to go along with one and resist the other. That is what we do in this 
paper. 
We have argued that there is nothing wrong, in principle, with treating 
institutions as endogenous. Though we may have doubts about the particular 
efforts of Posner and of North and Thomas, their methodology here 
cannot be faulted. Optimality is another matter. It is not obvious that 
the institutions-social, political, or legal-which exist are necessarily 
optimal. Of course they may be, but that conclusion cannot be clinched 
by merely citing the theorems of neoclassical economics. The optimality 
of institutions is the subject matter of this section and it will be argued 
that no such broad claim as is generally made in the ME can be maintained. 
Our position on this is thus similar to Field’s, although the arguments 
are distinct. 
Individuals choose in the marketplace, in shops, in labor markets. 
They do not choose between institutions, customs, and social norms. 
These evolve in response to a multitude of individual decisions spread 
over dtierent domains and large stretches of time. Standard neoclassical 
economics deals with choice in the marketplace and shows that, given 
certain conditions, individual rational decisions lead to optimal&y. That, 
too, is a very special kind of optimality , namely, a situation where it is 
not possible to make anybody better off without making someone else 
worse off.14 To claim the optimality of social institutions by citing the 
above argument from neoclassical economic theory, which applies to the 
limited domain of market exchange, entails a trespass which needs much 
greater justification than is provided by the protagonists of the NIE. In 
what follows we argue that such a venture is likely to be futile. 
The explatiation of a social institution or a custom consists of two 
tasks: we have to explain its persistence and its origin, These are very 
different questions. Both are difficult problems, but some recent research 
in economic theory throws interesting light on the persistence question 
z4 This view of optimality, namely Pareto optimality, has very little substance where 
the main problem is that cif distribution. Suppose two individuals are trying to share a 
cake. What is a Pareto optimal distribution? That each gets half? That one gets one-fourth 
and the other three-fourths? As a little reflection shows, all distributions are Pareto optimal. 
This is because no matter how the cake is cut to start with, if one tries to give more to 
one person, then one has to give less to the other. Thus not only does this view of optimtity 
fail to give us a unique rule or distribution, as in the above, it can declare everything to 
be optimal. The claim that “If a set of rules is Pareto efficient. . .it will be introduced” 
(see Field, 1981, p+ 185) may be quite meaningless since it presupposes the uniqueness of 
Pareto efficiency. 
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(in particular, Akerlof, 1976). What Akerlof’s work demonstrates is a 
purely logical possibility but it bears important implications for the issue 
we are considering. His work shows that it is possible for an institution 
to persist even though no individual benefits from this. That is, although 
everybody is worse off as a consequence of the institution, it is rational 
for each individual to comply with its norms because of a mutually 
sustaining structure of sanctions. Each individual fears violating the norm 
for fear of being ostracized. Those who do the ostracizing do so because 
they fear that if they do not ostracize those who violate the norms of 
society, then they themselves will be ostracized or will have to face 
social censure. 
It is important to appreciate this argument fully. Consider the Hindu 
custom of widowhood. As soon as a traditional Hindu woman is widowed 
she begins to wear coarse white saris, ceases to eat nonvegetarian food, 
and generally leads a frugal and secluded life. Why do women comply 
with this painful institution? While it is possible that some do so in the 
hope of compensation in the next life, most widows comply because of 
social sanctions and fear of ostracism. To complete a description of this 
situation, we need to explain why others would ostracize widows who 
did not comply. The reason is the same: while for a widow to lead a 
life of indulgence is wrong, it is also wrong to condone such indulgence.‘5 
What is interesting about this argument is that compliance with this 
custom is individually rational ceteris paribus. Of course in reality we 
seldom get such extreme examples, but what the above theory implies 
is that some individuals may be worse off because of custom. Hence 
the institution cannot be optimal. Thus we have established that a custom, 
once it has come into existence, may persist even though it is socially 
suboptimal (and even though it is rational for each individual to conform 
to it). 
While North has modified his earlier position somewhat, his argument 
on the optimality of institutions remains contrary to ours (see North, 
1981, p. 7). We have just shown that even with atomistically rational 
behavior, there is no assurance that socially inefficient institutions will 
automatically get dislodged. Further, contrary to Posner’s (1981) suggestion, 
the fact that an agent or group benefits from a particular institution does 
I5 This argument can be extended to encompass political issues such as the survival of 
unwanted regimes and the power and influence of some undesired men and political parties 
(Havel, 1985; Basu, 1986). It may be worthwhile cautioning that for lucidity and emphasis 
these models consider polar cases. They should not be taken to suggest a complete invincibility 
of customs once established. Indeed it is possible, in principle, to construct more elaborate 
models which can explain the genesis or the decay of customs. Though we do not have 
a formal theory to offer along these lines, some broad analysis and historical illustrations 
are presented in the next section. 
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not mean that the agent or group is the cause of it.i6 Every time a person 
dies, if we hold all those who benefit by this as responsible for the 
person’s death, then we would have a very disconcerting system of 
police. It is this fallacy which has led many writers in the NIE tradition 
and some sociological functionalists to foster the myth that the origins 
of institutions can be easily identified by referring to their consequences. 
We have not yet shown how suboptimal institutions come into being. 
This is where the question of persistence links up with the question of 
origin. What is fortunate is that a link is possible even without a full- 
fledged theory of origin. Let us assume what would be the most favorable 
theory of the origins of institutions from the point of view of Posner and 
of North and Thomas, namely, that an institution comes into existence 
when it is socially needed. Necessity is the mother not only of invention 
but also of institutions. This means that in its nascency an institution 
will indeed be socially optimal.17 But over long tracts of history what 
was once a necessity need not always be so. We have demonstrated 
above that institutions, once brought into existence, may persist. Thus 
at a particular time in a particular economy, there may exist lots of 
institutions which serve no social purpose and which, though once valuable 
to society, may now be actually harmful, They persist because of mutually 
sustaining networks of social sanctions. 
Since we have derived this under the assumption most congenial to 
the position of Posner and of North and Thomas, our criticism is made 
stronger. After all, it is not really clear that institutions do germinate 
out of social needs. We do not have a theory of the origins of social 
customs, which is a vast topic and quite beyond the scope of this paper, 
What we have shown is that even if institutions germinate out of needs, 
it is possible that many will be inefficient and suboptimal. Of course, if 
institutions emerge despite there being no social need for them, at any 
given date even more are likely to be suboptimal. Conversely, if institutions 
for which there is a need fail to emerge, society may be doomed to 
inefficiency. For example, if an institution could be developed to ensure 
that loans were always repaid, then credit markets would be vastly more 
efficient; but there is no a priori reason why individual rationality would 
result in such an institution. Indeed the fragmented credit markets o 
backward agrarian economies suggest that the emergence of such insti- 
tutions is not automatic. 
I6 There is in fact an ambiguity in Posner’s (1981, Chap. 7) treatment of optimality as 
be has a tendency to appeal sometimes to individual rationality and sometimes to groap 
rationality. 
” There is, however, a problem here. Inefficient institutions might grow faster than 
optimal institutions, perhaps too quickly (Schlicht, 1984a), and the selection argument 
might not necessarily lead to optimal institutions. It might lead, as it were, to maximal 
rather than optimal growth. North and Thomas (1973, p. 2) as well as North (1981, p. 6) 
do not take this into account. 
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In concluding this section, it is worth noting that in dismantling the 
optimality argument of NIE we have escaped trapping ourselves in a 
paradox. If everything that happens or exists is optimal, then both of 
the following policies would constitute an unwarranted interference: 
(i) The imposition of a tarfi, 
(ii) The removal of a tariff. 
Such a paralysis of action would strike everywhere. We would not be 
able to argue for more government or for less. We would have to claim 
that the custom of Hindu widowhood is desirable if it exists, and if it 
does not, then we would have to describe it as undesirable. This is a 
strange normative stance-strange but not, in itself, paradoxical. The 
paradox crops up once we recognize that policy changes do occur in 
reality, whereas if all policymakers submitted to this argument then no 
policy change would ever occur. 
4. INERTIA 
There are two main types of explanation of the forms of institutions 
in economic history which may be called structural and inertial. While 
these are not truly mutually exclusive, their points of emphasis differ. 
The former sees institutions as essentially the outcome of competing 
forces, and the latter sees them as the products of their origins or history. 
When neoclassical economists and those economic historians who are 
most openly in that tradition try to explain institutions, their approach 
tends to be structural, The current balance of forces is seen as responsible 
for the institution’s existence; former balances are seen as having held 
in place the institutions of any given past period. The logic is close to 
the Coase (1937) position that every institution is such that no additional 
advantage is to be gained (because of transaction costs) by any further 
change in rules or behavior, and is consistent with the Hicks/d’Alembert 
principle that every movement or state may be thought of as an equilibrium 
movement or state balancing one set of tendencies against a set of coun- 
ter-tendencies.” Without that, the institution would change faster in one 
or other direction, ultimately breaking up or swelling into a giant. 
Presumably as a result, there is little examination of the origins and 
evolution of institutions. These matters seem to be regarded as minor 
(formally, of no significance) compared with the forces acting at the 
moment under review. This is very different from the approach of the 
historically minded, who feel called on to trace the evolution of institutions 
from one moment to the next and to provide accounts of institutional 
emergence, on the working principle that earlier states account for later 
ones. No doubt the lack of deep historical treatment is one reason why 
general historians mostly ignore neoinstitutional economic history. 
‘* Cf. Schlicht (1985, pp. 45-46). 
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More seriously, the limited “realistic” treatment presented by many 
economists minimizes the informal,. but powerful, historical test to which 
such thinking ought to be subjected. Richness of detail smoothly borne 
is inherently desirable in an historical study and may be thought of as 
equivalent to the elegance for which mathematicians seek.19 This is not 
just a superficial aesthetic concern. The alternative (“theorist’s history”) 
may’ mean an uncontrolled selection of episodes that seem compatible 
with some model or another. Consecutive study of institutions through 
time puts’s far greater, and more salutary, strain on the writer’s command 
of context and evidence. The theorist is usually as overextended by this 
as is the historian in a theory field. There may be more point than at 
lirst meets the eye to the redundancy in much historicai research. 
There are other reasons why stereotyped neoclassical explanations are 
seldom fully convincing. The assumption that institutions are necessarily 
optimal in the sense intended by the logic seems implausible in the face 
of a profusion of cultural variants and the evidence of horrendous distortions 
of lives at the hands of many institutions created by man. Arguments 
that any institution must satisfy a maximizing principle for the individuals 
involved are not very convincing on descriptive grounds, whether or not 
an economistic rationalization can be found. 
Intuitively it is unreasonable to think of institutions as if they were 
selected de nova at every date ‘from a sheaf of blueprints and to ignore 
their origins and the ways by which they have arrived at their present 
state. Economic considerations may explain institutional scale, survival, 
and functioning, but that is like deducing the cost of keeping animals in 
a zoo and not explaining why we have those particular animals rather 
than some others. Kenneth Arrow gives as an example of facts that 
cannot be deduced by theory the resource gains from the Discoveries. 
No doubt the Discoveries were investment enterprises, but the results 
were determined by “the brute, though unknown, facts of geography.“20 
There also seems no reason to suppose a priori that competitive pressures 
are always sufficient to break up less than optimal institutions. A wide 
range of examples may fall in a tolerable range, and survive, that do not 
satisfy conditions of optimality. We may also suspect that ergo&city 
matters in the history of institutions as elsewhere in the real world, i.e., 
that final states may be independent of initial states. At the opposite 
extreme, arbitrary initial choices of institutional forms may sometimes 
behave as, small perturbations swirling unpredictabIy to great size, as 
shown in chaos theory.21 Whether there are realms of human activity 
I9 Jones (1984, p. 1152). For a criticism of North and Thomas for omission on the same 
lines, see Jones (1974, pp. 116-117). 
m Arrow (1969, p. 35). 
‘I This point was made in diierent terms by Bauer in his review article on Hicks, A 
Theory of Economic History (1971, pp. 163-179). See also Schlicht (1985, pp. 95-96). 
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more liable to chaotic disturbance than others is largely unexplored. 
Structural explanation is on firmer ground where it can be shown that 
different initial choices of institutions have converged over time on a 
single type which fulfills the one function, thus making the original choice 
unimportant compared with the forces balancing the later functions. 
The contrary, historian’s, approach attributes the existing set of in- 
stitutions to their origin or history as if that explained their persistence. 
This is argument by inertia, in the sense of changelessness. There is 
nothing truly explanatory in this, no guide to telling just what will survive 
or why eventual decay comes precisely when it does. Yet the procedure 
is surprisingly common. 
To take an example, a massive range of later, even present-day, cir- 
cumstances in the Middle East is sometimes attributed to the Mongol 
invasions of the 13th century. This view is badly stated by Alessandro 
Bausani, whose opinion is that the Iranian population remained 30% 
nomadic at ‘the end of the 19th century and remains backward today 
because the nomad invasions halted pre-Mongol developments.22 He even 
notes that some cities were larger before the Mongols came than they 
are now. “Though it would be an exaggeration and over-simplification,” 
Bausani remarks, “to attribute to the Mongol catastrophe and to the 
Turco-Mongol invasions in general, Islam’s decadence and inability to 
evolve after its initial auspicious leap forward, there is no doubt that the 
earlier collaboration and fusion that obtained in Iran after the Arab 
conquest was culturally more productive than that in Iran under the 
Mongols .“23 Luc Kwanten is more emphatic about the effects but a little 
less ambitious about the duration of the hangover: “It was not until well 
into the reign of the Safavids, some three hundred years later, that the 
dire consequences of the Mongol invasion began to disappear.“” The 
general form of such arguments is clear enough. Certain striking early 
changes, though not others, are held to have had enduring consequences. 
The frequency with which the inertia argument is made, eve,n at the 
whole society level, makes it surprising that the mechanisms by which 
it is supposed to operate are seldom spelled out. We might try to save 
the Mongol invasion hypothesis by suggesting that second-order 
effects built in a subsequent conservatism via political or religious in- 
stitutions, but’ this does little more than restate the thesis.2S Why the 
conservatism? Some structure might begiven to the argument by suggesting 
that conservative institutions were established to acquire and defend 
shares of the limited share of GNP left to the populace by the invaders, 
22 Bausani (1971, pp. 93, 124). 
23 Bausani (1971, pp. 122-123. 
24 Kwanten (1979, p. 215). 
2( A suggestion that churches first became powerful secular forces in China, the Near 
East, and Russia under Mongol rule is made by Schurmann (1967,,p. 6). 
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but this still fails to explain why the institutions were not dissolved after 
the invaders had merged with the locals or left. We are driven back to 
structural forces which went on maintaining institutions founded during 
the Mongol period. “If we find that short-term cost/benefit considerations 
constantly favoured the observed very long-term pattern . . . we shah 
have no need to rely on the postulate of cultural persistence, over un- 
specified periods, changeable by no predicted shift of incentives, and 
therefore incapable of explaining change when it did come.“26 
The difficulty with this is determining in historical instances, from 
actual evidence, just what the ratios of current and future costs and 
benefits associated with an institution were and were expected to become. 
As Field (1981, pp. 187, 190) correctly points out, the North and Thomas 
style of explanation comes down to asserting that institutions will not 
change so long as “conservative principles prevail,” i.e., so long as the 
overhead costs associated with a new institution are expected to be above 
those associated with an existing institution (and these must also not be 
expected to rise).27 At the level of historical analysis presented by North 
and Thomas, or “theorist’s history,” episodes tend to be depicted as 
compatible with the appropriate cost/benefit ratio on the most general 
grounds, without rigorous or extended historical, and especially quan- 
titative, warranting. Yet this need not always mean that the approach- 
the appeal to conservatism or its opposite-must be fruitless. ‘“In the 
absence of scientific history,” as Marshall (1920, p. 640) said, “short- 
lived man has little better means of ascertaining whether custom is quietly 
changing, than that the fly, born today and dead tomorrow, has of watching 
the growth of the plant on which it rests.” 
Perhaps the greatest dependence on the inertia thesis is found in the 
Hartz thesis.% In this the stunted societal development of former European 
colonies like the United States and Australia is attributed to their separation 
from the continuing evolution of thought in Europe. New worlds spinning 
off in space, they supposedly develop only along lines already laid down 
in Europe by some early, formative juncture in their history. Each is a 
fragment of Europe, a living fossil. “The Australian social adult of today 
is prefigured in the social embryo of yesteryear.“29 Yet, given printing 
and the international mails, the entry of new ideas was not blocked; it 
x Jones (1981, p. 14). 
” For a similar point with respect to the indeterminacy of change where North and 
Thomas infer the cost/benefit position from a lack of change-“conservatism”-+ change 
itself, see Jones (1974, p. 123). 
28 Hartz (Ed.) (1964, p. 14). A very recent case of argument by inertia is a work criticized 
by Herr (1985, pp. 613-614) for finding remote origins of economic hindmnces in contemporary 
Spain (e.g., “feudal” agriculture) whereas these things have in reality changed in Spain 
as elsewhere. 
w Rosecrance, in Hartz (Ed.) (1964, p. 276). 
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must have been a limited absorptive capacity of institutions themselves 
in the new lands that blunted their response to what Hartz calls ‘-‘the 
stimulus to change.“30 But that would depend on a social theory, not 
articulated, predicting that institutions,in European colonies must suffer 
from inertia (“a kind of immobility,” says Hartz) whatever the stimulus. 
Subsequent equilibrium forces are made ‘to seem entirely secondary. 
There certainly are problems of several kinds with the inertia approach. 
One is the false homogenization of institutions, which were often quite 
different in function from time to time and place to place, produced by 
attaching the same name to them. Scholars are prone to over-labeling of 
this kind; the indiscriminate use of the terms “feudalism” and “capitalism” 
are the ,classic cases. Consider how empty a seeming continuity can be 
with an illustration from the English open field system. At Yarnton Mead, 
Oxfordshire, the ceremony of drawing lots for strips of hay was still 
carried out every July through the 1960s. Holly wood balls inscribed with 
the Saxon names of the rights were drawn from a bag, the tread was 
run, the strip marked with the year’s owner’s initials cut in the turf, and 
there followed some weeks when the hay might, and indeed must, be 
carried. But none of the farmers who continued the ceremony wanted 
or used the hay; it was, sold to Oxford hospitals to feed the rabbits used 
in experiments. Antique though the ceremony undoubtedly was, its true 
content had evaporated along with the agricultural economy that had 
originally spawned it. 
Sometimes the scholar can trace changes m content through the internal 
evidence of the wording of documents. Property deeds from colonial 
Vermont transfer land between husbandmen and yeomen, terms retained 
by folk memory even though they ceased to have precise meaning in 
America. In Vermont some of the archaic legalisms relating to land can 
therefore be watched as they become mere proprieties, sanctioning trans- 
actions yet without the original or even an exact meaning in the New 
World. An ,attempt to hang on to meaning was the rather desperate use 
of a half-remembered “free simple” (sic, for “fee simple”) to assimilate 
Vermont titles to the more secure New Hampshire (rather than the less 
secure New York) ones in the early 1770~.~’ 
Apparently timeless institutions thus change and decay beneath their 
surface forms. Although changes in content are hard to spot given the 
gaps and formal repetitiveness of primary documents, this means that 
history is an imperfect guide to the later purpose and effect of institutions. 
Even what seems to be the most immutable institution of all, the Indian 
” Hartz (Ed.). (1964, p. 3). 
31 We owe the colonial examples to Jonathan hugnes (persona communication). See 
also Hughes (1986). 
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caste system, has clearly begun to change, and what is more it is consciously 
manipulated by the powerful rather than held inviolate by tradition.32 
Many of the references to inertia are unconscious reflexes on the part 
of historians. There seems to be a working rule, rather than a developed 
system of ideas, which implies that origin or history necessarily contain 
within themselves an explanation of whatever comes after. To a large 
extent this is misleading, an appeal less to history in the sense of the 
forces at work than merely to the past, to antiquity as such. Rationalization 
is evident here, unconstrained by rules as to what parts of the past will 
matter. This is nowhere more evident than in genealogy, with its massive 
overemphasis on tracing the male line and on the more remote ancestors 
whose blood in reality matters least. Jack Fisher dealt with this in his 
LSE inaugural lecture, when he noted that one of the most pathetic 
stories of the 16th century was of Lord Burghleigh’s attempt to trace 
his descent from a Welsh princeling “who probably never existed and 
who, if he did exist, was probably hardly distinguishable from the sheep 
of his native hill~.“~~ 
Having said this and although languages do often respond to economic 
necessities (as we have discussed), we are still entitled to believe that 
there are senses in which history does matter, where there is real stickiness 
of content as well as form. Were this not the case, the Quebecois would 
speak English. Without a particular history, certainly, there could be no 
explaining why their minority language is French, or why any minority 
cultural choices around the world are the ones that we see them to be. 
The Welsh in Patagonia do not speak Urdu, the Pakistanis in Bradford 
do not speak German, and the Russian Jews in Chicago do not speak 
Maori, although they all speak languages which impose costs that are in 
turn balanced-probably slightly less than balanced-by pressures within 
each minority group. 
A characteristic way in which particular histories are said to make a 
difference is through the influence of individual actors. From time to 
time an economist insists that market forces will induce similar behavior 
whoever are the individuals concerned. Engels took a comparable view, 
though with a different vision of the forces involved than merely supply 
and demand. This empties much of the content out of history. The notion 
may be acceptable where the behavior of large numbers of people is at 
stake, since this permits the pattern predictions consistent with theories 
of evolution or competition, where we can think of individual variations 
as tail-end distributions. It becomes silly where no shelter can be found 
behind a law of large numbers, where vast and complex decisions really 
are influenced by the preferences (and psychopathology) of great men 
” See especially Sri&as (1962). 
33 Fisher (1957, p. 14). 
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or by single events that determine which fork of a major decision, yes 
or no, will be chosen. As with the problem of colligation, i.e., where in 
time to start a history, there is no determinate way to tell correct from 
incorrect approaches. Scholarly judgment in terms of the purpose of the 
analysis must decide whether group or individual behavior is what counted. 
All that we can currently ask of judgments about group versus individual 
priority is that they be consistent and perhaps carry rhetorical conviction.34 
Yet another case where history matters is when psychological and 
cultural interlinkages exist, so that if a rule is changed, then other rules 
must also be changed, but this is prohibitively costly, perpetuating “history” 
for a very long time. An example is the Hindu custom of widowhood 
to which we have already referred. On the face of it a widow’s life is 
thoroughly uncongenial and it would be a merciful and profitable act to 
renegotiate the conditions. But this might alter the whole meaning of 
marriage within the culture and therefore be seen as a prohibitively costly 
move. Institutions persist, therefore, that might not be chosen afresh 
from all the available blueprints. 
In the literatures of economics, neoinstitutional economic history, and 
history that someone interested in institutions might be expected to peruse, 
two main lines of thought occur. The textbook equilibrium approach 
makes little or no extended appeal to history and, while successful insofar 
as it refers to comparative statics, cannot properly account for the observed 
range’of institutions, many of them probably suboptimal, The pure inertial 
approach is better at accounting for the variety of institutions, the menu 
of choices available at past dates, but has little success (and only rarely 
makes an attempt) at explaining just what does or does not persist. 
There is no automatic permanence for some arbitrary set of all insti- 
tutions, nor is there a moment by moment renegotiation of all the institutions 
we observe. Surface similarities and overlabeling help historians to ex- 
aggerate the importance of beginnings. An excessive faith in optimality 
and the omission of psychological and cultural elements from the calculus 
help economists ‘to neglect the historical path to the present. Structural 
and historical,explanations turn out to be complementary. 
Three sets of forces, not’one or two, act on each institution: those 
tending. to break it up, those tending to maintain or expand it, and those 
tracking <in from the specific form of the last known position. The existence 
of the balancing forces seems intuitively obvious to economists and is 
indeed latent, though seldom specified, in many historical accounts. Yet 
the historical path is Nmanifest, too; without taking it into consideration 
the observed range of institutions can hardly be explained. Although 
34 We are interested to note a very recent attempt to argue that forensic skill is an 
inherent, if covert, method in economics and to make it openly fashionable. See McCloskey 
(1985). 
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what persists may sometimes be merely a shell with new forces changing 
its functions, at other times stabilizing forces may be thought of as inertial 
since they keep an old custom intact and vital. The economic historian 
concerned with an institution needs to allow both for its origins or some 
of its earlier positions at any rate, and for the forces acting on it. 
5. CONCLUSIONS 
In discussing the issues of endogeneity, optimality, and inertia, we 
have tried to give an assessment of NIE with respect to economic history. 
Our main claim is that the NIE approach fZi-uitfully challenges the dangerous 
tendency in historical accounts which derives from “merely placing things 
together in a certain order, and consciously or unconsciously suggesting 
post hoc ergo propter hoc.“3’ We have argued that the choice of givens 
depends on the problem which is to be analyzed and involves substantive 
hypotheses about the subject matter rather than taste for a particular 
intellectual tradition. We have argued too that the question of optimality 
is largely unclear in NIE chiefly because the tendencies and obstacles 
to optimality need to be spelled out in the case at hand. It needs to be 
stated why individual rationality or the formation of custom may or may 
not lead to efficiency improvements. A gross application of the “invisible 
hand” paradigm without proof is certainly misleading in institutional 
analysis. Finally, we have urged that a proper blending of structural and 
historical arguments is needed. Although little more is known today about 
the growth .and decay of customs than Marshall knew, we should not 
dismiss the questions raised by the new institutional economics merely 
because we are not always satisfied by the answers so far obtained. 
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